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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether that the policy-based allocation of
long-term funds played a n important role in promoting the high economic growth in
post-war Japan.  Using  the panel data functions of Japanese  firms,  we  estimate
Tobin’s Q investment functions in two different sample periods腼 1972-84 and 1985-96.
In 1972-84, we find that the long-term loan ratio had an additional positive effect on
investment.   In particular,  the result holds true  regardless of the size of corporate
cash flows or the type of corporate groupings.   However, in 1985-96, we cannot find
that a higher ratio of long-term loans increased the Japanese firm’s investment.  The
result  indicates that the size of long-term loans had a great influence on the firm’s
investment only before the financial liberalization in Japan.  
JEL #: E22, G21, G28
Key Words:  Long-term Loans, Economic Growth, Tobin’s Q
                                         
* Previous versions of this paper were presented at Institute for Posts and
Communications Policy, Japan  Society of Monetary  Economics  (Tohoku University),
Fukushima University, and Hitotsubashi University.    We were favored with valuable
suggestions from M. Hanazaki, K. Suzuki, and A. Horiuchi as well as comments from
attendants at the meetings of those institutes and workshops.
** Correspondence to: Shin-ichi Fukuda, Faculty of Economics, the University of Tokyo,
Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.  Phone: +81-3-5841-5504, Fax: +81-3-
5841-5521, E-mail: sfukuda@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp2
1.  Introduction
In post-war Japan, b ank loans had been the major source of external funds for
almost all firms.   Except for few firms, i nternal financing  was highly limited, and
issuing corporate bonds had been strictly regulated until the mid 1980s.   The typical
Japanese firms relied heavily on bank borrowings to finance their investment  funds.
The bank based system generally worked well at least before financial liberalization.
The  “main bank”  system was a typical feature of  the  system that  had played an
important role in reducing the agency costs of Japanese  firms.   However,  in the
Japanese bank based system, some of the firms also benefited from  the policy-based
allocation of “long-term loans”.
Among Japanese policymakers, there was  an  implicit  agreement that the policy-
based finance allocated to specific fields of industry was successful  in supporting the
postwar high-growth.   In particular, it was an implicit common sense that long-term
funds provided by long-term credit banks and the Japan Development Bank played an
important role for high economic growth.    From the macroeconomic  viewpoint, the
policy-based allocation of long-term funds is warranted, if the allocated long-term funds
had great external effects in increasing capital  stock and production.    However, if the
financial  market is perfect, the arbitrage between short-term and long-term loans
works well.   In such a case, it is indifferent for  the  corporations whether their
investments are financed with long-term funds or with rolled-over short-term funds
(i.e., “the Modigliani-Miller theorem”).   It is, thus, not self-evident whether the policy-
based allocation of long-term loans  could  effectively increase capital  stock and
production of specific corporations or not.
In previous literature, there are several  empirical studies that stressed the role of
Japan Development Bank’s loans (henceforth called “JDB loans”) in increasing capital
stock and production of specific industries and corporations.    For example,  Horiuchi
and Sui [1993] carried event studies of corporations listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange
Second Section, and demonstrated JDB loans were apt to increase capital investment.
Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994) carried the similar studies, using company-specific
data in the overall machinery industry, and came up with an outcome supporting the
pump-priming effect of JDB loans. 1
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Higano (1986) is one of the earliest studies that reached the same conclusions
without rigorous analysis.  To the contrary, Horiuchi and Otaki (1987) analyzed
related issues by using industry-level macro data, and proved that such effects were
scanty in many industries.    Beason and Weinstein (1996) also came to a paradoxical3
From the macroeconomic viewpoint, however, the weights of JDB loans among total
external borrowings were not so high except for a few corporations.    This paper, thus,
empirically examines whether the total long-term loans  腼 not only JDB loans but also
including private long-term loans  腼 had an effect of increasing capital investment of
specific corporations in post-war Japan.   In previous literature, a series of papers by
Teranishi, et al. (e.g., Teranishi (1982), Takei and Teranishi (1991)) are outstanding
studies, which proved that the policy-based allocation of the long-term loans
contributed to increasing capital stock and production of specific industries during the
high-growth period in postwar Japan.  However, the analyses by Teranishi and others
relied  solely  on  the aggregated  time-series data.    In contrast, this paper tries to
examine the appropriateness of their concept by estimating  standard  investment
functions based on the panel data of individual Japanese firms.
In previous literature, t here have been a  large number of studies  which estimate
investment functions, using the panel data of Japanese firms.2    In particular, Hoshi,
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) estimated investment functions taking account
of the role of “main banks” and demonstrated that a company belonging to an affiliated
business group (“keiretu”) was less restricted by the liquidity constraint.3   Although
both the main bank and policy-based allocation of long-term funds were inherent
features  of Japan’s financial market in the high-growth period, the mechanism of
affecting investment are intrinsically different from each other.    That is, finance by
main banks took the form of rolled-over short-term loans,  and played the roles of
easing short-term liquidity constraints.   In contrast, long-term funds are provided in
anticipation of mid- and long-term growth of corporations.    Therefore, at least when
arbitrage did not function well between the short-term and long-term financial markets,
the allocation of long-term loans had an effect of lessening credit crunches of long-term
investment funds.
In the following analysis, we estimate Tobin’s Q investment functions and examine
whether the long-term loan ratio  has an additional  positive  effect on investment.
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††
conclusion that the more dependent an industry was on JDB loans, the lower was its
growth rate.  
For example, Asako, Kuninori, Inoue, and Murase (1989, 1997), Hayashi and Inoue
(1991) and Suzuki and Ogawa (1997).
The conclusions of Hoshi et al. were confirmed by, for example, Okazaki and Horiuchi
(1992) and Ogawa and Suzuki (1997).   Hayashi (1997), however, asserts that the
conclusions of Hoshi et al. are not robustly supported when excluding some outliners.4
The data is based on the corporation-specific financial data from NIKKEI NEEDS in
the five industries of iron & steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, electrical equipment
and transportation equipment.   Provided that the concept mentioned above is right,
restrained long-term loans would have restricted investment before the financial
liberalization, even if corporations had a high Tobin’s Q and a big size of cash flow.
The first purpose of this paper is thus to examine whether the ratio of long-term loans
to total loans had an additionally positive effect on investment in the sample period
prior to the financial liberalization.
As the financial liberalization progresses, however, arbitrage between long-term and
short-term funds began to work in the financial  market.    As a result, in the recent
Japanese economy, it becomes natural to suppose that  long-term loans have lost their
policy-based roles and that only  the  fundamental variables have an impact on
investment decisions.   The second purpose of this paper is thus to examine how well
such a diminished role of long-term funds  can be confirmed by the estimation of
investment function  of Japanese firms for two alternative periods of 1972-1984 and
1985-1996.4
In the estimated investment functions,  we find that  even if we allow various
fundamental variables such as Tobin’s Q, profit, and cash flow, the coefficient of long-
term loan ratio is always significantly positive  for the sample period 1972-1984.   
However, for the sample period 1985-1996, the coefficient of long-term loan ratio  is
never significantly positive.    This  implies that long-term loans  which had important
roles for investment before  the financial liberalization  came to lose their  effect on
investment during a past two decade.
This paper is organized as follows.   S ection 2 discusses the roles of long-term funds
for investment.    Section 3  sets  out the investment functions and  explains the  data
which are used to test the theoretical hypotheses.    Section 4 explains the construction
procedure of capital stock and Tobin’s Q.   S ection 5 presents the estimate results of
the investment functions when the long-term fund ratios  are  added to explanatory
variables.   Section 6 examines whether long-term funds have any different influences
on investment between keiretsu-affiliated and non-affiliated  firms.  S ection 7
investigates the influences the ratio of long-term loans on Tobin’s Q.   Finally, section
8 puts together the major results of the analysis and discusses remaining issues.
††††††††††††††
In this connection, Fukuda, Ji, and Nakamura (1998), using corporation specific data,
demonstrated that the structure of corporate demand for long-term funds substantially
changed in the mid-1980s.5
2    The Roles of Long-Term Funds
If the policy-based allocation of long-term funds can increase capital stock and
production, then it may be justified to allocate long-term funds preferentially to those
industries and corporations that have large positive external effects for macro economy.
However,  the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  implies that if the financial market works
perfectly, individual firms are indifferent whether its investment is financed with long-
term funds or short-term funds.5  It is, thus, not clear  whether the policy-based
allocation of long-term funds could have any contribution to increasing investment of
specific industries or firms.
One possible case where the policy-based allocation of long-term funds  works well
may arise when the financial market is highly regulated at the developing stages of an
economy.   For example, it is well known that the Japanese government had taken
aggressive strategies of allocating long-term funds to specific industries from  the
postwar rehabilitation period  to the  high-growth period.   Since  the government set
long-term interest rates much  lower than short-term interest rates, the  policy-based
allocation meant that the borrowers received a kind of subsidy that served their growth.
Furthermore, since the policy-based allocation of long-term funds was determined as a
series of governmental economic plans,  it was  combined with other policy measures
such as investment tax credit.    As a result, the  allocation of the long-term funds
implied that the government would keep supporting the borrowing firms or industries
from various policy measures.   In other words,  the  policy-based allocation of funds
could  give signals of the government’s fostering a specific industry and served to
provide information on mid- and long-term growth of  the borrowing  corporations
during the high growth period in Japan.   
In addition, to the extent that information asymmetry exists in the financial market,
the policy-based allocation of long-term funds  may  have  provided additional
information about mid- and long-term growth of  the borrowers.    In the Japanese
financial market, it was pointed out that main banks’ monitoring provided information
about borrowing companies in terms of short-term financing.   However, it would be
difficult  for the main banks  to provide mid-term  and long-term  information about
††††††††††††††
Diamond (1991, 1993) showed that even with no institutional regulation, individual
corporations are not indifferent towards whether to borrow long-term funds or to roll
over short-term funds for financing capital investment, in the case of market failure
occurring due to information asymmetry.6
corporate growth, since the main banks, such as city banks and local banks, have
traditionally been engaged in providing short-term funds.    Particularly, since
information has a property of public goods, profit-maximizing private banks could not
afford to provide sufficient information about the growth prospect of corporations  that
are expected to have substantial positive external effects on other corporations.    Thus,
the policy-based allocation of long-term funds could be evaluated from a different point
of view than the provision of short-term  information by private financial institutions
such as main banks.
3  The Estimated Equation and the Data
Based on the theoretical  hypothesis discussed in the preceding section, we shall
identify what additional effects the long-term loan ratio had on individual corporations’
investments.   In identifying the effects,  we  use individual corporations’ financial
data and estimate the following Tobin’s Q type investment functions.  
(1)腀It/Kt 膁  Constant term + a*Xt-1 + b*腅LONGt-1 腀
where It = investment amounts in the period t, Kt = capital stocks in the period t, Xt =
fundament variables in the period t, such as Tobin’s Q, profit, and cash flow, and
LONGt腀= the long-term loan ratio in the period t-1.    As referred to in the next section,
Kt and Tobin’s Q are converted into the market values.
In contrast with the standard investment functions, t he long-term loan ratio
(LONGt) is added to the explanatory variable in eq. (1).   This is because in the case
that long-term funds impose different restrictions than short-term loans on investment,
the size of long-term fund ratio is supposed to affect the size of investment, even if the
total amounts of loans are the same.   Providing that the concept mentioned in the
preceding section holds true, thus, the long-term loan ratio is supposed to have had a
significantly positive impact on investments in the period before the financial
liberalization.   Since the impact of each fundamental variable is also positive, both
coefficients a and b are, hence, expected to be significantly positive before the financial
liberalization.   After the financial liberalization, on the other hand, the fundamental
variables have a positive effect on investments, but the long-term loan ratio itself is
supposed to have a diminished effect on investments since arbitrage between long-term
and short-term funds works.  Thus, it  is  expected that  only  coefficient  a has a
statistically significant positive value and that coefficient b becomes less significant.
In the following analysis, bank loans are divided into long-term and short-term ones.7
Loans with a maturity exceeding one year are defined as  “long-term  loans” and the
ratio of long-term loans to total loans is defined as “long-term loan ratio”.   We use t his
definition because the maturities of bank loans are classified only into those below and
above one year in the financial data.  As fundamental variables Xt‘s, we use not only
Tobin’s Q but also profit and cash flow that are normalized by dividing by the market
value of capital stock respectively.   In order to avoid the problem of instantaneity bias,
all the variables are estimated with a lag of one period.
The investment functions are estimated by an industry-specific panel analysis (the
fixed effect model and random  effect model) including corporation dummies and time
dummies.  All the data used for estimation are based on the data  set  contained in
NEEDS-COMPANY by Nihon  Keizai  Shinbun.    Those data are  originally  based on
individual corporations’ financial reports listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange First-
Section and Second-Section.   The data used cover the period from 1970 through 1996.
The estimation period  is from 1972 through 1996.6    The analysis covers corporations
belonging to the five industries of iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals,
electrical equipment, and transportation equipment (including ship building and
automobile manufacturing).    As to those corporations whose data were partially
missing in the estimation period, their samples are included by using an unbalanced
panel analysis.
4  The Estimation of Capital Stock
The data used in our estimation basically depend on each individual corporation’s
financial data.   In calculating the market value of capital stocks, we first apply  the
perpetual inventory method for four types of capital stocks: (a) buildings and structures,
(b) machinery and equipment, (c) vessels and vehicles, and (d) land.   We then added
up the converted capital stocks to calculate the aggregate capital stocks  of individual
corporations. 7   Except for land, the values of 1970 were taken as the benchmark, on
the assumption that this year’s book values of individual capital stocks are equal to
their market prices. 8
††††††††††††††
Many companies close their books in March, but not all the companies covered by the
analysis did so.    Data are, thus, arranged on the basis of calendar year when books
were closed.
Tools, apparatus and fixtures are not included in capital stocks, because their values
are much smaller than those of other capital stocks.
For example, discrepancies at the time of 1970, if any, would have less substantial8
For deflector, we used the  wholesale price index ( pIi
t) corresponding to each
investment goods i .   Specifically, we used the wholesale price index of  construction
materials  for buildings and structures, the wholesale price index  of  machinery and
tools  for  machinery and equipment, and the wholesale price index  of  transportation
equipment for vessels and vehicles as the deflectors.    Each nominal gross investment
is calculated by adding the book values of capital depreciation to the increments of each
fixed asset. 9   Dividing the nominal gross investment by the investment goods deflector
results in the real gross investments (Ii,t) of each individual tangible fixed asset.
The physical depreciation rate of capital stocks (di) is calculated according to Hayashi
and Inoue (1991) and Hulten and  Wykoff (1981).    They estimate the rates of asset
depreciation at 0.047 for buildings and adjunctive equipment, at 0.09489 for machinery
and equipment, and at 0.1470 for vessels and vehicles and transportation equipment. 10
Upon obtaining the bench marks for capital stocks, real gross investments, and
depreciation rates, we can calculate the real values of each individual capital stocks
represented by the index i by the following expression:
(2)腀Ki,t = (1-di)Ki,t-1 + Ii,t
The market value of capital  stocks ( pIi
tKi,t) can be obtained by multiplying the real
stock values by the deflector of capital goods (pIi
t).
The series of land stock are also calculated using the perpetual inventory method.
The benchmark  year  is 1970, as is the case with other stocks.   H owever,  since  the
discrepancies between the market prices and book values were large, the benchmark
for the market prices of land was obtained by multiplying the book values in 1970 by a
5.27.   The value of 5.27 is the average ratio of market price to book value in 1970
calculated by Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998).    In calculating the ratio, they divided the
market prices of the land owned by private non-financial corporations capitalized less
than ¥10 million by the book values of the land owned by overall industry, based on
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††
effect on estimation, since the estimation periods start from 1972.
Data from the NIKKEI NEEDS do not tell the book values of capital stock-specific
depreciation, so that the book values of capital stock-specific depreciation were
calculated by allocating the total book values of capital stock depreciation (net of land)
in proportion to the book values of each individual capital stock.
㄰ For the depreciation rate of structures, estimated at 0.0564 by Hulten and Wykoff,
we used a 0.047 rate identical to that of buildings and adjunctive equipment.9
the Annual Report on National Accounts (the Economic Planning Agency) and the
Quarterly Corporations Statistics (the Ministry of Finance).
The increases in the market value of land are calculated by the increases in the book
values.   However,  the  decreases in the book value of  land, i.e. sold-out land, are
converted into market prices based on the LIFO (last-in-first-out) assumption that the
sold-out land was purchased at the last purchase point of time.   In previous studies,
Hoshi and  Kashyap (1990), Ogawa (1990) and Ogawa and Suzuki (1997) used  the
similar assumption.   The land price (pL
t) used for the deflector is the “national index of
urban land” (the average price for overall purposes), excluding six major cities, based
on the Index of Urban Land Price (Japan Real Estate Institute).
Define the increase in the book value of land by ILANDt and its decrease by DLANDt.
Then, the market value of land investment (NILANDt), the market value of land stock
(LANDYt= pL
tLt), and the real value of land net  investment (ILt) can respectively be
calculated by the following equations:
  (3)  NILANDt腀= ILANDt 腼 (pL
t/pL
t-1)*DLANDt,
 (4)  LANDYt腀=腀(pL
t/pL
t-1)*DLANDt-1  腻  NILANDt,
 (5)  ILt腀膁 ( ILANDt/pL
t) - (DLANDt/pL
t-1),
   On the other hand, Tobin’s average Q is calculated as follows:
(6)  Tobin’s Q  膁腀
￿ -




t t t t t t t
K P
DEF OTHER INTAN CONSR CUR LIB V .
where  Vt =  corporation’s market price represented by its share price,  LIBt = total
liabilities,  CURt = current asset,  CONSRt = construction in process,  INTANt =
intangible fixed asset, OTHERt =  financial  investment and other assets, and DEFt =
deferred asset. 11
In the following analysis, we estimate the investment functions based on the market
value of capital stock with and without land.   H ence, when we use the market value of
capital stock without land, we calculate the Tobin’s Q by deducting the market value of
land (pL
tLt) from both numerator and denominator in (6).
Table 1 shows average values and standard deviations of estimated Tobin’s Qs with
††††††††††††††
ㄱ Except for stock prices, any of the variables is based on the financial data of
individual corporations.    Share prices are stock prices adjusted for dividend off.10
and without land in the five industries of iron and steel (50 companies), nonferrous
metals (76 companies), chemicals (125 companies), electrical equipment (186
companies) and transport equipment (79 companies, including shipbuilding and
automobile manufacturing).  It indicates that Tobin’s Q without land has a smaller
standard deviation than Tobin’s Q  with land, which suggests that Tobin’s Qs  have
small dispersions without land in each industry.   By contrast, in the electrical
equipment industry, the values of Tobin’s Q as well as standard deviations are large in
general.  Regardless of whether land is included in capital stocks, the average value of
Tobin’s Qs is close to 1 in other four industries (iron and steel, nonferrous metals,
chemicals and transportation equipment), which is consistent with the economic theory.
5  The Results of Estimation
This section estimates an investment function represented by eq. (1), using the data
series of “capital stock” and “Tobin’s Q” prepared in the preceding section.  According
to Fukuda, Ji, and Nakamura [1998], the financial liberalization in the mid-1980s have
caused a substantial structural change in the flow of long-term funds.  We thus split
the period of estimation into 1972-84 (before the financial liberalization) and 1985-96
(after the financial liberalization).    We then attempt  a panel analysis of the fixed
effect model and  the random effect model, including a corporation dummy and time
dummy, with respect to each of the five industries (iron and steel, nonferrous metals,
chemicals, electrical equipment and transport equipment).12
Table 2 shows the results of estimation, using capital stocks including land.    The
results for the period of 1972-84 are shown in Table 2-1 and those for the period of
1985-96 in Table 2-2.    Firstly, the estimates of  “a”, which is the coefficient of
fundamental variables, are positive both before and after the mid-1980s, and supports
the standard theoretical results.   The results remain the same even when  either
Tobin’s Q, the profit rate, or cash flow is used as a fundamental variable.    The t-
values are also statistically significant, except for the random effect model for the iron
and steel industry.
However, the estimates of “b”, which is the coefficient of the long-term loan ratio, are
completely different between 1972-84 and 1985-96.   That is, the estimates of b are all
positive in 1972-84.  In particular, t-values are significantly different from zero except
for chemicals, and the results have goodness of fit.    The result supports the hypothesis
††††††††††††††
ㄲ Since shipbuilding is peculiar in the transportation industry, estimations were
attempted for both of the cases including and excluding shipbuilding firms.11
that even with the total amounts of loans being given, the long-term loans  had an
additional positive impact on investment before the financial liberalization.  
In 1985-96, by contrast, the estimates of b never take a significantly positive value.
In the two industries of iron/steel and nonferrous metals, they are positive but are not
statistically significant.  In the three industries of chemicals, electrical equipment and
transportation equipment, they become negative.    This means long-term loans have
had no  significantly  positive impact on investment after the mid-1980s when the
financial liberalization progressed.  
The above results are robust even when we use different explanatory variables.    For
example, Table 3 indicates the results of estimation when we use capital stocks without
land.    The comparison between  Table 2 and Table 3 show slight differences in the
estimates of individual coefficient.   However, the estimates in both tables are almost
similar in sign and statistical significance, which supports our hypothesis even in the
case that capital stocks do not include land.
In Table 4, we set out the results of estimation in the case where both Tobin’s Q and
profit (or cash flow) are used as explanatory variables to estimate eq. (1).13   The theory
implies that Tobin’s Q is a sufficient statistic  for investment  if the market works
perfectly.   H owever, previous  empirical  studies  showed that since  corporations face
with liquidity constraints, profits and cash flows have an important explanatory power
in estimating an investment function even if Tobin’s Q is included in the explanatory
variable.   The results in Table 4 reconfirm  this previous result in any industry and
any period, suggesting that many Japanese corporations faced with liquidity
constraints throughout the periods.
However, as far as  we focus our attention to the coefficient of long-term loan ratio,
“b”, the inclusion of plural fundamental variables has nothing to do with the estimated
results.   That is, Table 4 shows that as in Table 2, the estimates of “b” are all positive
in the 1972-84 period, while those in the 1985-96 period  never take significantly
positive values.    This indicates that although profit or cash flow might ease the short-
term liquidity constraints, they could never help reducing the constraints of long-term
funds before the financial liberalization.  This implies  that the long-term constraints
should be separated from the short-term liquidity constraints at least before the
financial liberalization in Japan.
††††††††††††††
ㄳ Without loss of generality, we reported the case where capital stocks include land in
Table 4.12
6  The Roles of the Keiretsu Corporate Grouping
In the preceding section, we have demonstrated that up to the mid-1980s, a higher
ratio of long-term loans had a positive effect on  investment even w hen we include
fundamental variables such as Tobin’s Q in the explanatory variables.    We have also
indicated that the effect of the long-term loan ratio has nothing to do with the size of
profit or cash flow, and that the constraints due to a shortage of long-term funds are
essentially different from short-term liquidity constraints caused by a shortage of cash
flows.
This section examines the robustness of the latter implication by looking at whether
the effect of long-term loan ratio on investment is different between keiretsu-affiliated
corporations and non-affiliated ones.   Some of previous studies proposed that a
corporation belonging to a keiretsu corporate grouping faces lesser liquidity constraints.
If policy-based allocation of long-term loans is an alternative means to ease liquidity
constraints, then the proposition implies that the allocated long-term loans would have
had stronger effects on investment for non-affiliated corporations than for affiliated one.
Loans from main banks, however, are basically short-term funds and have the role of
easing short-term liquidity constraints such as working funds.   By contrast, the policy-
based long-term funds are provided in anticipation of mid- and long term prospects of a
corporation.    Therefore, at least in the period when arbitrage between the short-term
and the long-term funds did not function well, the allotment of long-term funds might
have served to lessen the constraints of long-term funds.   
Splitting corporations belonging to the five industries, covered by our analysis in the
previous section, into two groups of keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-affiliated
ones, we shall estimate an investment function represented by eq. (1) with respect to
each group.   We compare the estimates of “b”, a coefficient to indicate the effects  of
long-term fund ratio on investment, between keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-
affiliated ones.   As far as the above conception is correct, no substantial differences
are supposed to exist between keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-affiliated ones
concerning the effects of long-term loans on investment
Based on the 1995 version of  Keiretsu no  Kenkyu by the Economic Research
Institute, the corporations belonging to the four corporate groupings or the six
corporate groupings are assorted into “keiretsu-affiliated companies” and the others
are assorted into  “non-affiliated companies”.    The period of time covered by the
following analysis is 1972-84.    This is because the preceding section observed that
long-term funds had a positive effect on investment in this period.    As the result of
splitting corporations into two groups, the sample size for each estimation becomes13
reduced.  Thus, in the following estimations, we attempt a panel analysis by way of
pooling all the data of corporations belonging to the five industries, rather than make
industry-specific estimations.
Table 5 reports the results of estimation when we use capital stock including land.
Firstly, the estimates of  “a”, which is the coefficient of fundamental variables, take
positive values regardless of whether corporations belong to keiretsu corporate
groupings or not, and their t-values are all significantly different from zero.    However,
the coefficients of Tobin’s Q are bigger for keiretsu-affiliated companies than for non-
affiliated companies, which  may  show keiretsu-affiliated companies have closer
relations between Tobin’s Q and investment and less effects from liquidity constraints.
The estimates of “b”, which is the coefficient of “long-term fund ratio”, take positive
values regardless of whether corporations belong to keiretsu-affiliated groupings or not.
The estimates themselves are almost the same between corporate groups, or, on the
contrary, they are a little bit larger for keiretsu-affiliated companies than those for
non-affiliated ones.   These results clearly do not support the hypothesis that even
before the mid-1980s, long-term funds had larger effects on the investments of non-
affiliated companies than on the investments of keiretsu-affiliated companies.   It is
thus evident that long-term funds had not served as an alternative to ease short-term
liquidity constraints in non-affiliated companies.
Our findings, however, indicate that long-term funds have a slightly bigger effect on
the investments of keiretsu-affiliated companies than on those of non-affiliated ones.
This property of long-term funds is not so much significant statistically.   However, if
that is true, main banks and long-term funds have mutually supplemental effects on
easing liquidity constraints.    That is, long-term funds had significantly affected
investments at least until the mid-1980s, while they had been more effective in the way
of corporate groups whose liquidity had been less limited because of the main bank’s
support.   This consequence conforms to the hypothesis attained by Horiuchi and Sui
[1993] , and would be worthy of closer scrutiny in our future researches.
7  The Effects of Long-term Funds on Tobin’s Q
The results of the estimations  in the previous sections have illustrated that even if
we added fundamental variables to explanatory variables, a higher ratio of long-term
funds  has a positive effect on the amounts of investment before the financial
liberalization.    This implies that before the financial liberalization, investment was
substantially restrained even in a corporation with favorable investment opportunities,
unless they could borrow as much long-term funds as necessary.   In other words, as a14
corporation had easier access to long-term funds, it could more easily realize favorable
opportunities for investment and achieved higher growth before the financial
liberalization.
However, throughout these studies, it was not clear how the ratio of long-term funds
affects the fundamental value of each corporation.  The analysis in this  section is thus
aimed at identifying how the size of the ratio of long-term loans to total loans affects
the fundamental corporate values represented by Tobin’s Q.    If long-term funds can
ease mid- and long-term financial constraints, then a corporation with larger long-term
funds  will  have higher potential to realize their investment opportunities.  Thus, a
corporation with larger long-term funds  can have a larger Tobin’s Q in this respect.
However, an increase in capital stock due to eased constraints on funds reduces the
marginal productivity of capital, which in turn has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q.
Therefore, the total effects of the long-term fund ratio on Tobin’s Q are theoretically
ambiguous, even if long-term funds have an effect of easing mid- and long-term
limitations on funds.
To identify  the total effects of the long-term fund ratio on Tobin’s Q , we regress
Tobin’s Q on both fundamental variables and the long-term fund ratio.   Specifically,
we estimate the following equation by a panel analysis including constant terms, using
the same financial data used in the previous sections.
(艖)腀艰t = constant term + a*Pt-1 + b*LONG t-1  +  ht
where  艰t = Tobin’s Q in t-period and Pt-1 = profit or cash flow in t-1 period.
In  eq. (7), all the variables lag at one period in order to avoid the problem of
simultaneous bias.   In calculating  Pt-1, both p rofit and cash flow are normalized by
dividing by the market values of tangible fixed assets.   As a corporation has a higher
profitability, Tobin’s Q would become bigger, so that the coefficient  “a” is supposed to
be positive.   However, since the total effects of the long-term fund ratio on Tobin’s Q
are theoretically ambiguous, the sign of “b” is not determined a priori.
Table 6 illustrates the estimates in the case where capital stocks including land are
used in Equation (7).   The estimates for the period of 1972-84 are shown in Table 6-1
and those for the period of 1985-96 in Table 6-2.    The estimates of “a”, which is the
coefficient of fundamental variables, are all positive in the estimate periods both before
and after the mid.1980s.    The result supports the standard hypothesis that the higher
is profitability, the larger is Tobin’s Q.   The t-values are also significantly different
from zero for the estimates of “a”.15
The estimates of “b”, which is the coefficient of “long-term loan ratio”, are, on the
other hand, much different between 1972-84 and 1985-96.    The sign of  “b” is not
definite in the estimations for 1972-84, varying industry by industry.    By contrast, it
is observed in the estimations for 1985-96 that  “b” is all negative in the sign.
Particularly, in some of the industries of iron and steel, chemicals and electrical
equipment, t-values are significantly different from zero.   It is evident, thus, that an
increase in the long-term loan ratio is apt to significantly decrease Tobin’s Q after the
financial liberalization.
8  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have estimated investment functions of Japanese corporations in
order to identify how the allocation of long-term funds contributed to facilitating
corporate growth.   In the postwar Japan,  the government  had allocated long-term
funds to specific sectors until the introduction of the financial liberalization.   As a
result, our estimations have demonstrated that  before the financial  liberaliazation,
corporations with a higher ratio of long-term loans made significantly high investments,
regardless of fundamental variables such as Tobin’s Q.    In particular, our estimations
have made it clear that the roles played by long-term funds are independent of the
sizes of corporate cash flows and of whether a corporation belongs to a keiretsu
corporate grouping.    This finding suggests  that long-term loans had facilitated the
potential of corporate growth in a different way than main banks did, before the
financial liberalization.
The financial liberalization, however, has remarkably increased the substitutability
between long-term and short-term bank loans, as well as that between bank loans and
corporate bonds.   This implies that after the financial liberalization, the flow of long-
term funds  began to be determined  by market mechanism rather than  by  the
government policy.    Our estimations have supported this view and could not find that
a higher ratio of long-term loans gave the incentive to make significantly big amounts
of investment after the mid 1980s.
In interpreting our estimation results, however, we need to keep in mind several
limitations of our analysis.  First, because of  using corporation-specific data, we
cannot  identify  whether policy-based long-term loans enhanced the potential of
industry-wide growth in a target industry.    In particular, since our analysis focused on
the manufacturing industry, we are not sure that the above conclusions also hold true
in non-manufacturing industries.    During the high-growth era, significant amounts of
long-term funds were allocated to infrastructure-related industries such as power16
utilities and urban developments, rather than to the manufacturing industry.   Thus,
it remains for our future researches to see how well the main results in this paper will
hold when we include the non-manufacturing industries in our samples.
Second, we need to remember that the policy-based allocation of long-term funds had
not  necessarily  aimed at promoting the growth, but rather had played a role of
structural adjustments under some circumstances.   For example, i n some industries,
the policy-based long-term funds were not allocated to several successful corporations
because their superior projects were able to be successful without policy-based long-
term funds.  In other industries,  the allocation was targeted at declining sectors
because of costly structural adjustments.  In those industries, even if the policy-based
allocation of long-term funds were successful,  a negative inducing effect  might  be
observed from a macroeconomic point of view.
  Finally, we need to note that the recent allocation of long-term loans did not aim at
fostering specific i ndustries in many cases.   In fact, the priority areas for long-term
funds in the 1970s were land developments (local and urban developments) and the
prevention of public pollution, and those in the 1980s  were energy resources-related
industries and sectors beyond the conventional industrial framework.    The approach
of this paper  cannot  evaluate these inter-industry allocations of long-term funds
because it cannot capture repercussion effects of long-term funds beyond the industrial
framework.17
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistic of Tobin’s Q
(1) The case of capital stock including land
Average Standard  Number of
Deviation Samples
Iron & Steel
1971-84 1.03603 1.66485 643
1975-84 1.05668 1.90303 471
1985-96 1.35711 1.04978 596
Nonferrous Metals
1971-84 1.10598 1.09497 877
1975-84 1.06007 0.97028 641
1985-96 1.83458 2.10871 861
Chemicals
1971-84 1.29397 1.80299 1549
1975-84 1.28881 1.84053 1127
1985-96 1.6025 1.62928 1456
Electrical Equipment
1971-84 3.67443 8.05434 2004
1975-84 3.83776 8.81992 1466
1985-96 2.9081 4.99273 2088
Transportation Equipment
1971-84 1.248 1.65817 954
1975-84 1.12298 1.36916 690
1985-96 1.17314 0.99024 896
(2) The case of capital stock not including land
Average Standard  Number of
Deviation Samples
Iron & Steel
1971-84 1.00985 2.19623 643
1975-84 1.02183 2.46776 471
1985-96 1.57453 1.69316 596
Nonferrous Metals
1971-84 1.02067 2.21587 877
1975-84 0.89046 2.12955 641
1985-96 2.48359 4.49438 861
Chemicals
1971-84 1.42381 2.87749 1549
1975-84 1.37989 2.69617 1127
1985-96 1.94832 2.55941 1456
Electrical Equipment
1971-84 5.36245 13.80353 2004
1975-84 5.35215 14.39372 1466
1985-96 4.03135 8.50317 2088
Transportation Equipment
1971-84 1.3346 2.51165 954
1975-84 1.11799 1.92877 690
1985-96 1.36135 1.72395 89620
Table 2  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry
 - The Case of Capital Stock Including Land
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01969 3.36905 *** 0.00364 1.21368
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15852 4.00559 *** 0.08619 3.32876 ***
Hausman Test 0.00060
Profit Rate 0.23928 5.92602 *** 0.23996 6.60785 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.13412 3.81007 *** 0.07726 3.34671 ***
Hausman Test 0.09110
Cash Flow 0.48316 6.88681 *** 0.49278 7.82164 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12517 3.58300 *** 0.07731 3.43371 ***
Hausman Test 0.19270
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02929 7.40403 *** 0.02114 6.76576 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12175 5.49077 *** 0.05204 3.57734 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.04544 4.25576 *** 0.06079 6.21874 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.09952 4.52212 *** 0.04533 3.27160 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.03248 3.09956 *** 0.04514 4.47638 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.10155 4.59238 *** 0.04896 3.41484 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01759 6.12598 *** 0.01528 7.74153 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01348 0.67343 0.00337 0.25623
Hausman Test 0.41570
Profit Rate 0.23751 6.63199 *** 0.23724 8.61837 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02587 1.33921 0.02241 1.72260 *
Hausman Test 0.97100
Cash Flow 0.64533 10.16410 *** 0.60358 12.27330 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00331 0.17420 0.00193 0.15407
Hausman Test 0.5698021
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00713 9.09618 *** 0.00311 8.28647 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05728 4.33098 *** 0.03138 3.68161 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.08984 10.17110 *** 0.10536 19.19240 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.03709 2.94382 *** 0.02653 3.24918 ***
Hausman Test 0.05640
Cash Flow 0.12675 8.78237 *** 0.18321 19.07750 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04108 3.24313 *** 0.02295 2.86690 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01353 5.51411 *** 0.00828 5.22660 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05994 3.07577 *** 0.01561 1.37328
Hausman Test 0.00020
Profit Rate 0.50024 11.84460 *** 0.38309 10.88100 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05288 25.94311 *** 0.02711 2.37180 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38470 7.67576 *** 0.35071 8.74403 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06353 3.39113 *** 0.02816 2.34296 **
Hausman Test 0.02980
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01332 5.46319 *** 0.00800 5.02923 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04652 2.38107 ** 0.01276 1.10863
Hausman Test 0.00110
Profit Rate 0.52497 11.07710 *** 0.38382 10.06270 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04489 2.48040 ** 0.02632 2.29220 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.44113 8.10354 *** 0.38049 8.89105 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05211 2.78745 *** 0.02337 1.92902 *
Hausman Test 0.03450
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level22
Table 2  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry
 - The Case of Capital Stock Including Land
(2) The Period of Estimation : 19785-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02102 4.72586 *** 0.01963 5.30099 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01261 0.50685 0.01802 1.20266
Hausman Test 0.80200
Profit Rate 0.33697 6.35166 *** 0.30004 6.89531 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01606 0.65757 0.01992 1.33725
Hausman Test 0.44880
Cash Flow 0.41463 4.60787 *** 0.41897 5.54659 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00776 0.31281 0.01684 1.13713
Hausman Test 0.89930
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02340 12.05080 *** 0.01633 13.27620 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00571 -0.38356 0.00305 0.30521
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.21989 11.38240 *** 0.24469 15.41560 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00113 0.07496 0.00304 0.30275
Hausman Test 0.07410
Cash Flow 0.55194 7.03328 *** 0.61720 10.31280 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00303 0.19062 -0.00225 -0.19997
Hausman Test 0.39370
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01606 10.62500 *** 0.01465 11.84170 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02827 -2.92174 *** -0.01444 -2.30441 **
Hausman Test 0.02680
Profit Rate 0.56287 13.99360 *** 0.41394 14.00530 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03662 -3.91507 *** -0.01241 -1.89925 *
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.82438 13.21670 *** 0.59493 14.52390 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03081 -3.26878 *** -0.01405 -2.27245 **
Hausman Test 0.0000023
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00665 16.31400 *** 0.00535 15.37660 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05797 -6.15343 *** -0.03975 -5.68001 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.01299 3.31561 *** 0.03076 9.47366 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07549 -7.42380 *** -0.04531 -5.99826 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.03501 4.50396 *** 0.07102 10.90000 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07560 -7.45556 *** -0.04490 -6.04456 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02641 9.73145 *** 0.02272 9.45658 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07390 -5.58965 *** -0.03386 -3.75077 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.30828 5.43849 *** 0.33144 7.00603 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09195 -6.91573 *** -0.03874 -4.56754 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38173 7.34442 *** 0.42873 9.76243 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09397 -7.18984 *** -0.03667 -4.60130 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02653 9.00998 *** 0.02284 8.95300 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07830 -5.67609 *** -0.03054 -3.32208 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.47898 6.96148 *** 0.45624 8.30453 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09474 -6.98014 *** -0.03627 -4.22991 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.41830 7.64527 *** 0.45064 9.42059 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09920 -7.37539 *** -0.03876 -4.64083 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level, and * significant at a 10% level. 24
Table 3  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry
 - The Case of Capital Stock not Including Land
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02094 4.00502 *** 0.00293 1.18518
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.18669 3.87254 *** 0.06937 2.51451 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.19477 6.31057 *** 0.19457 7.12831 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.16264 3.79182 *** 0.08890 3.10400 ***
Hausman Test 0.06620
Cash Flow 0.37328 6.72610 *** 0.38767 7.86953 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15095 3.52746 *** 0.08513 3.04626 ***
Hausman Test 0.12660
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01275 5.34436 *** 0.01035 5.41164 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15741 5.64925 *** 0.07985 4.22287 ***
Hausman Test 0.00030
Profit Rate 0.01896 2.40453 ** 0.02660 3.55514 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12895 4.66814 *** 0.07106 3.65767 ***
Hausman Test 0.00120
Cash Flow 0.01137 1.52323 0.01637 2.25505 **
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.13129 4.74521 *** 0.07186 3.64948 ***
Hausman Test 0.00160
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01453 5.90531 *** 0.01296 7.38000 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02046 0.81826 0.00084 0.04999
Hausman Test 0.34560
Profit Rate 0.29928 11.74630 *** 0.23447 13.09600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04513 1.92745 * 0.03102 2.19584 **
Hausman Test 0.00130
Cash Flow 0.66355 14.71750 *** 0.61330 16.73010 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01014 0.44286 0.00428 0.27676
Hausman Test 0.1402025
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00433 9.02277 *** 0.00203 7.61229 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06232 3.89284 *** 0.03520 3.33938 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.09444 13.22770 *** 0.07363 18.25010 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04525 2.98386 *** 0.03750 3.64927 ***
Hausman Test 0.00090
Cash Flow 0.14712 11.78210 *** 0.13994 19.26090 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05292 3.46623 *** 0.03268 3.36645 ***
Hausman Test 0.15840
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01224 6.53538 *** 0.00765 5.81919 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07303 3.04181 *** 0.02361 1.60600
Hausman Test 0.00010
Profit Rate 0.37490 14.41180 *** 0.29698 13.07600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06036 2.78617 *** 0.04482 2.96741 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.34762 9.71679 *** 0.32043 10.81260 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07297 3.18682 *** 0.03885 2.60487 ***
Hausman Test 0.05400
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01203 6.50145 *** 0.00745 5.66550 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05457 2.28150 ** 0.01946 1.31304
Hausman Test 0.00030
Profit Rate 0.37131 13.09160 *** 0.28290 11.71300 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04868 2.22647 ** 0.04157 2.75668 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38667 10.08800 *** 0.34227 10.92760 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05669 2.49727 ** 0.03290 2.19933 **
Hausman Test 0.04980
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level26
Table 3  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry
 - The Case of Capital Stock not Including Land
(2) The Period of Estimation : 1985-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01464 3.55132 *** 0.01374 3.86585 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01177 0.31602 0.01596 0.67648
Hausman Test 0.89130
Profit Rate 0.23998 5.17110 *** 0.23857 6.18780 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01059 0.28837 0.01905 0.85964
Hausman Test 0.95590
Cash Flow 0.28341 3.70388 *** 0.32331 4.76509 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00610 0.16419 0.01856 0.82218
Hausman Test 0.49890
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00895 8.63041 *** 0.00719 9.61816 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00593 0.30010 -0.00277 -0.22178
Hausman Test 0.03950
Profit Rate 0.10155 9.04343 *** 0.10733 11.35960 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01880 0.97655 0.00375 0.29715
Hausman Test 0.38610
Cash Flow 0.42637 9.42043 *** 0.42380 11.21760 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02389 1.24507 0.00718 0.55368
Hausman Test 0.49070
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00913 8.00727 *** 0.00840 8.96572 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02082 -1.78836 * -0.01051 -1.44074
Hausman Test 0.21370
Profit Rate 0.38000 12.03480 *** 0.28356 12.19400 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02793 -2.47049 ** -0.00490 -0.63917
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.58952 14.07110 *** 0.52588 15.96340 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.01926 -1.73509 * -0.00995 -1.27082
Hausman Test 0.0216027
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00428 13.79430 *** 0.00331 13.15170 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.04080 -3.68057 *** -0.02647 -3.45571 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.02988 10.64290 *** 0.03541 15.36220 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05524 -4.78488 *** -0.02802 -3.53749 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.05373 10.93310 *** 0.06681 15.94540 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05616 -4.87231 *** -0.02867 -3.66910 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01630 8.83862 *** 0.01371 8.30269 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07433 -4.61038 *** -0.03070 -2.86111 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.30108 7.72921 *** 0.28876 8.66557 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08732 -5.55105 *** -0.03576 -3.56433 ***
Hausman Test 0.00010
Cash Flow 0.32538 8.73387 *** 0.37081 11.19690 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08873 -5.69572 *** -0.03095 -3.40080 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01608 7.96775 *** 0.01364 7.76371 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08316 -5.00217 *** -0.02615 -2.45825 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.36513 7.44940 *** 0.33955 8.54885 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09220 -5.72916 *** -0.03106 -3.10939 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.33453 8.49130 *** 0.36749 10.29080 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09770 -6.14336 *** -0.03263 -3.44868 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level28
Table 4  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry
- The Case of Tobin’s Q and Other Fundamental Variables being Included Together
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01480 2.52077 ** 0.00065 0.22213
Profit Rate 0.18922 4.21582 *** 0.20894 5.19609 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.14874 3.81029 *** 0.08319 3.34127 ***
Hausman Test 0.00990
Tobin's Q 0.01481 2.55588 ** 0.00057 0.19800
Cash Flow 0.39203 5.07253 *** 0.43213 6.19534 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.14067 3.62098 *** 0.08395 3.42740 ***
Hausman Test 0.01480
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.03011 7.64267 *** 0.02177 7.07101 ***
Profit Rate 0.03447 3.21628 *** 0.04109 3.90366 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.11633 5.26363 *** 0.04726 3.31835 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.03071 7.75473 *** 0.02255 7.26786 ***
Cash Flow 0.03090 3.09070 *** 0.03756 3.79999 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.11666 5.27636 *** 0.04686 3.28804 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01449 5.00499 *** 0.01087 5.19328 ***
Profit Rate 0.20906 5.49123 *** 0.17388 5.74132 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02416 1.21442 0.01350 1.03033
Hausman Test 0.11700
Tobin's Q 0.01258 4.43980 *** 0.00833 4.09145 ***
Cash Flow 0.62760 9.34476 *** 0.53241 9.74646 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00517 0.26632 -0.00169 -0.13269
Hausman Test 0.0135029
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00499 6.20054 *** 0.00112 2.75852 ***
Profit Rate 0.14365 8.66795 *** 0.13290 9.93400 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04863 3.75058 *** 0.02825 3.48865 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.00618 7.78379 *** 0.00178 4.78319 ***
Cash Flow 0.13494 5.73932 *** 0.17673 8.74116 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05563 4.24743 *** 0.02592 3.29690 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00813 3.41988 *** 0.00557 3.17827 ***
Profit Rate 0.45018 10.08320 *** 0.34251 8.86335 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05694 3.09395 *** 0.02399 1.94783 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01181 4.89983 *** 0.00614 3.93777 ***
Cash Flow 0.32879 6.52650 *** 0.28299 6.90147 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06181 3.24482 *** 0.01444 1.31014
Hausman Test 0.00010
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00798 3.34197 *** 0.00534 3.01260 ***
Profit Rate 0.46603 9.15121 *** 0.33818 7.88039 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04839 2.60845 *** 0.02216 1.77587 *
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01137 4.76590 *** 0.00605 3.81411 ***
Cash Flow 0.37738 6.86989 *** 0.30458 6.92317 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04995 2.62884 *** 0.01127 0.99550
Hausman Test 0.00010
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level30
Table 4  Estimation of Investment Function by Industry 
- The Case of Tobin’s Q and Other Fundamental Variables being Included Together
(2) The Period of Estimation : 1985-1996
Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00967 1.94240 * 0.00799 1.85110 *
Profit Rate 0.28687 4.73002 *** 0.25580 4.97362 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01676 0.68704 0.02004 1.36756
Hausman Test 0.54490
Tobin's Q 0.01552 3.26746 *** 0.01380 3.31166 ***
Cash Flow 0.30192 3.11777 *** 0.31313 3.65285 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01145 0.46413 0.01577 0.92867
Hausman Test 0.87510
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01865 8.66435 *** 0.01270 8.76989 ***
Profit Rate 0.24694 4.79749 *** 0.20313 4.76964 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00651 -0.44435 0.00575 0.57338
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02086 10.22340 *** 0.01377 10.44010 ***
Cash Flow 0.30083 3.75184 *** 0.28540 4.67323 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00457 -0.30989 0.00539 0.55378
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00935 5.99833 *** 0.00946 6.92272 ***
Profit Rate 0.52319 11.16460 *** 0.36061 9.64791 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03484 -3.77866 *** -0.01437 -2.21561 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01174 7.87713 *** 0.01040 8.13495 ***
Cash Flow 0.71534 11.06320 *** 0.50155 10.57830 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02855 -3.09983 *** -0.01677 -2.69702 ***
Hausman Test 0.0000031
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00405 8.94072 *** 0.00288 7.61549 ***
Profit Rate 0.20662 11.35420 *** 0.20868 13.01600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05285 -5.83361 *** -0.03779 -5.70835 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.00551 13.30080 *** 0.00398 11.62640 ***
Cash Flow 0.16312 9.45319 *** 0.18928 11.62810 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05513 -6.01684 *** -0.03801 -5.82528 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02410 8.52854 *** 0.01954 7.73834 ***
Profit Rate 0.15858 2.77841 *** 0.17407 3.46854 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07543 -5.72740 *** -0.03387 -3.82674 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02409 9.05577 *** 0.01983 8.80039 ***
Cash Flow 0.30639 6.06653 *** 0.36404 8.32413 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07690 -5.96946 *** -0.02884 -3.57668 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02189 6.97209 *** 0.01750 6.31014 ***
Profit Rate 0.28714 3.94302 *** 0.27125 4.39341 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07961 -5.83458 *** -0.03113 -3.46354 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02378 8.27891 *** 0.01980 8.21062 ***
Cash Flow 0.34230 6.38729 *** 0.37822 7.93591 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08146 -6.09383 *** -0.02888 -3.43701 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level32
Table 5  Investment Functions of Keiretsu-Affiliated and Non-Affiliated Groupings 
All Industries (Fixed Effect Model)
(i) Four Major Keiretsu Groupings
Keiretsu-Affiliated Grouping Non-Affiliated Grouping
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
TobinQ 0.01938 13.24950 *** 0.00616 6.84234 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.08543 6.95808 *** 0.05916 4.64137 ***
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01384 8.62628 *** 0.00581 6.47418 ***
Profit Rate 0.15511 7.92228 *** 0.05800 5.75163 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.08359 6.89509 *** 0.05464 4.30466 ***
(ii) Six Major Keiretsu Groupings
Keiretsu-Affiliated Grouping Non-Affiliated Grouping
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
TobinQ 0.01354 12.74650 *** 0.00520 4.76569 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07543 7.09282 *** 0.06449 3.94865 ***
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01232 11.53070 *** 0.00383 3.51576 ***
Profit Rate 0.64498 7.14286 *** 0.18712 7.20758 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07298 6.90766 *** 0.05148 3.18312 ***
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level33
Table 6  Regression of Tobin’s Q by Industry : The Case of Capital Stock Including Land
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 0.66636 2.57041 * 0.72819 1.99957 **
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.44424 -1.12103 -0.49467 -1.54779
Hausman Test 0.19680
Cash Flow 1.19480 1.87307 * 1.29168 2.03471 **
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.46568 -1.39624 -0.51372 -1.60335
Hausman Test 0.24390
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 1.12559 5.19712 *** 1.43294 6.90110 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.26248 -1.37428 0.01830 0.11152
Outlier Dummy 14.50160 10.53040 *** 16.70250 12.80260 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 1.16799 5.36422 *** 1.41263 6.70243 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.25294 -1.32583 0.01056 0.06378
Outlier Dummy 15.38710 10.31200 *** 17.33460 12.14320 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 0.60858 1.31194 1.50064 3.36983 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.23882 0.97331 0.35902 1.57359
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 2.12936 2.54389 ** 3.54891 4.39989 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.17722 0.72358 0.23691 1.03858
Hausman Test 0.00000
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 3.07175 4.13894 *** 5.07767 7.05738 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -2.73597 -4.58273 *** -2.56467 -4.52345 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 2.83706 2.67506 *** 4.74182 4.54363 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -2.56550 -4.29825 *** -2.34111 -4.10974 ***
Hausman Test 0.0000034
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 2.49359 3.77614 *** 2.72279 4.22392 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.57486 2.07195 ** 0.55517 2.17551 **
Hausman Test 0.27830
Cash Flow 2.14695 2.54634 ** 2.57138 3.12365 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.62712 2.24903 ** 0.59773 2.33351 **
Hausman Test 0.05930
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 3.14647 3.99045 *** 3.43289 4.48961 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.59060 2.01559 ** 0.58929 2.19059 **
Hausman Test 0.32860
Cash Flow 2.97224 2.93825 *** 3.41044 3.47163 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.63344 2.14850 ** 0.61472 2.27247 **
Hausman Test 0.17370
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
腩 2腪 The Period of Estimation : 1985-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 2.68472 5.12253 *** 3.31841 6.79739 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.72372 -3.00903 *** -0.36968 -1.90520 *
Hausman Test 0.00050
Cash Flow 3.48982 3.94481 *** 4.39637 5.23478 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.78808 -3.24919 *** -0.44915 -2.25655 **
Hausman Test 0.00040
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 6.95600 8.73728 *** 8.65087 12.11540 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.04764 -0.17774 -0.17052 -0.73909
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 6.25660 4.46788 *** 8.79372 6.99766 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.01032 -0.03709 -0.19987 -0.81557
Hausman Test 0.0001035
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 8.90055 16.12910 *** 9.52906 19.12160 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.41917 -3.54577 *** -0.28816 -2.78626 ***
Hausman Test 0.00060
Cash Flow 8.48323 9.97546 *** 9.43943 12.36260 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.33661 -2.68380 *** -0.28311 -2.56125 ***
Hausman Test 0.02730
Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 8.86995 10.95790 *** 9.69041 12.47090 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.68942 -1.46366 -0.62509 -1.49815
Hausman Test 0.00120
Cash Flow 5.45317 6.25495 *** 5.92085 6.93742 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -1.00385 -2.08454 ** -0.89558 -2.08236 **
Hausman Test 0.03110
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 1.51307 2.03430 ** 2.26594 3.23566 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02384 -0.13431 -0.09948 -0.68222
Hausman Test 0.00880
Cash Flow 0.39966 0.56800 0.24136 0.35695
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03256 -0.18230 -0.08921 -0.59798
Hausman Test 0.60460
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 4.10997 4.62475 *** 4.95631 6.03197 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02613 -0.14731 -0.11794 -0.81499
Hausman Test 0.02690
Cash Flow 0.71700 0.98339 0.68321 0.96630
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05419 -0.29975 -0.11907 -0.78234
Hausman Test 0.79200
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level